The 'evolutionary turn' in economic geography has led to increasing emphasis on coevolution among technologies, organizations and territories. The weakness of this approach, however, is a focus on broad coevolutionary pictures that pays little attention to coordination processes that guide interdependent actions on the ground. Using the Taiwanese information technology industry as an example, this article suggests an industrial system analysis that gives a structural coherence to a series of intentional, collective actions. Such a systemic measure has the potential to extend the evolutionary analysis beyond broad coevolutions to the strategic transformations of industrial organizations.
Introduction
During the last decade, an 'evolutionary turn' has begun to emerge in economic geography (Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Bathelt and Glu¨ckler, 2003; Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Scott, 2006) . The attempts to apply evolutionary economics to the realm of economic geography have refreshed our understanding of the dynamism of regional growth and development. For example, as suggested by Boschma and Lambooy (1999) , one can use routines and path dependence to shed light on regional adjustment, or link chance and increasing returns to the key topic in economic geography, agglomeration economies, which could be regarded as the spatial connotation of increasing returns. The main benefit of the evolutionary approach is to highlight the forms of increasing returns or positive externalities, which enable regionally centered coevolutionary processes among technologies, organizations and territories to unfold. In turn, this may increase the capacity of regions to adjust, improve or revamp their own economies, particularly in a world of increasing variety and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the confluence of evolutionary economics and economic geography is still, in the words of Martin and Sunley (2006, p. 428 ), on 'a relatively youthful, immature and emergent intellectual path'. Several challenges loom ahead. The most critical one is how to specify evolutionary notions in a regional context, particularly how to make theoretical connections between microevents that happen at the firm level, and their spatial repercussions that can usually be observed only at the regional level. A meso-level conceptualization is thus needed to fill this theoretical gap. We are enthusiastic about this quest. As a result, in this article, we use the Taiwanese information technology (IT) industry as a template, to suggest a meso-level context that could link rules, routines and institutions to their coevolutionary outcomes. Drawing on Storper's (1997) 'holy trinity ' and Saxenian's (1994) industrial system, we suggest that this meso-level comprises three spaces: the technological, the organizational and the territorial. Together these give a structural coherence to a series of intentional, collective actions, and enable us to grasp the multi-faceted nature of coevolution.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical context of coevolution, and introduces our meso-level approach. Section 3 describes our research methods. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the case studies. Finally, a concluding section returns the discussion to the implications on regional policies, and suggests future directions.
Coevolution, industrial system and coordination
With the evolutionary turn in economic geography, the term 'coevolution' has been the buzzword to denote the mutually reinforcing interaction between path-dependent trajectories in a regional economy, or the 'path interdependence' (Martin and Sunley, 2006) . Various interlinking effects can emerge to trigger synergies among different 'arenas' within a region. They might be a set of interrelated industries, linked by traded and untraded interdependencies (Kenney and von Burg, 2001) , or a wide range of firms, technologies and institutions, intertwined into a complex web of networks and structures (Murmann, 2003; Consoli, 2005) . The representative manifestation of coevolution in economic geography is agglomeration, which has been widely recognized in the discussion of regional development, from backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958) , cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1959) , growth poles (Perroux, 1988) , to more recent versions of new growth theory (Marin and Sunley, 1998; Webber, 1998) . Accounts differ, but a capital-intensive infrastructure that permits economies of scale, inter-firm linkages that generate externalities, labor pooling that promotes knowledge spillovers, and Schumpeterian endogenous innovations, are generally considered as variables of increasing returns and path dependence.
The heterogeneous manifestations of coevolution have highlighted the complex interactions among developmental trajectories of technologies, organizations and territories, particularly the various forms of increasing returns or positive externalities that might start off new, hybridized developmental trajectories or paths. This raises two questions. The first question concerns the role of human agency. Is coevolution the outcome (both intended and unintended) of collective actions deliberately created by actors, or just an unintended consequence of interlinking effects accidentally triggered by discrete actors? In the treatment of human agency, evolutionary economists take two contrasting views. Some, drawing on studies of technological evolution, argued that a trajectory, once selected, may generate self-reinforcing processes that determine or 'lock-in' the direction of development that is beyond the control and capabilities of human agency (David, 1985; Ruttan, 2001 ). Others, drawing on studies of institutional evolution, emphasized that a trajectory is both the outcome of and the constraint upon collective actions of human agency (North, 1990; Setterfield, 1993) . The key to this contrast lies in the scope and malleability of a trajectory or path. When it supposes a specific technology or standard, it is largely unable to provide the room for the undoing, modification or transformation of the collective decision. A choice that has been made is made forever. Conversely, when it comes to a set of rules, standards, norms and conventions that are to be reproduced and improvised by daily practices, then, through the orchestration of strategic purposes and deliberate actions, microevents and occurrences may lead to structural changes that start off a new path of development.
The second question grapples with the context. Under what circumstances does coevolution arise? In what ways do developmental trajectories from different arenas converge and reinforce each other? Previous discussion on agglomerations tended to focus on territorially bounded contexts. For some, the context is based on locally specific institutions, particularly appropriate institutional arrangements that guide collective actions towards successful ongoing adaptation in the face of uncertainty (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Jones, 1998; Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 1998) . From their view, building strong sets of local institutions in both public and private sectors not only reinforces existing agglomerations, but also reduces the tendencies of firm relocation and lowers the risks of industrial shakeout as a result of industrial restructuring. Others concerned with the relations between firms and their embedded networks, which range from social ties, business networks, production networks, to formal or informal associations, on how these relations promote resource sharing, information flows, decentralized learning as well as other forms of synergies and agglomerations (Grabher, 1993; Yeung, 1994; Amin and Cohendet, 1999) . However, in contrast to these views that deal directly with the context's influence on the routines of firms in some top-down way, the evolutionary approach will have to develop the contexts in some bottom-up way by concentrating on how these contexts are to be selected and evolved.
Here we want to answer these two questions by proposing a meso-level context that could link rules, routines and institutions to their coevolutionary outcomes (Figure 1 ). The analytical framework of this context starts with the premise that locally specific contexts are important, but to put too much explanatory power on them, however, is in danger of oversocializing economic behaviors and actions, depriving economic actors of their reflexivity as if they live in the iron cage of institutional bars or relational webs. There is no doubt that, for development to take place, a region must benefit from economies of scale and scope derived from agglomerations: economies of scale can be achieved through highly localized concentrations of specific knowledge, skills and expertise; while economies of scope can exist if the intangible benefits of learning and the cooperative atmosphere are to be reaped. But there is also a need to unpack the black box of agglomerations, because economies of scale and scope are phenomena that obtain under particular conditions, and are themselves the result of more fundamental evolutionary processes.
Scholars from Los Angeles (Scott, 1988 (Scott, , 1993 Storper and Scott, 1989) have neatly linked firm actions to agglomerations via an analysis of transaction costs associated with interfirm linkages. Agglomerations are considered as the outcome of the minimization of transaction costs, because, other things being equal, a greater number of external linkages increases flexibility and raises the probability of successful sale or purchase, both of which contribute to cost and risk minimization, especially in uncertain situations. Storper (1997) later extended the analysis of transaction costs to transactions that are not based on market calculations, which he regarded in terms of untraded interdependencies. In his equation, untraded interdependencies constitute frameworks of action, which, mediated by the reflexivity of actors in consideration of external conditions, develop into a plurality of possible worlds of action that coordinate collective actions in different arenas of a regional economy (Storper, 1997) . Lucky regions are endowed with important stocks of these relational assets, or vice versa.
We rely heavily on these kinds of accounts, but we also recognize the availability of external economies beyond territorially bounded contexts, as suggested by Phelps (1992) . It has been customary to argue that there are multiple sources of increasing returns or externalities undergirding regional development, both territorially and nonterritorially bounded. Regional development thus depends upon the reinforcement and amplification of agglomerations and externalities from the multiple sources. In Figure 1 , we draw on Storper's (1997) notion of the 'holy trinity' to suggest a context comprising three spaces: the technological, the organizational and the territorial. In line with Nelson and Winter (1982) and Maskell (2001) , we emphasize that the micro-unit of analysis is the economic agent and its routines, and it is the evolution of routines, rules or norms undergirding collective actions that sketches the boundaries of these spaces.
For the sake of making our proposition clearer and more specific, we use the Taiwanese IT industry to portray the evolution of these three spaces. The technological space is delineated by a technological paradigm, which evolves from design or operational rules, linked by interrelatedness at the architectural level. According to Dosi (1988) , the technological paradigm is both the artifact to be worked on and improved, and a set of heuristics about how to proceed. For the IT industry, this particular paradigm has been recognized as a modular system (Langlois, 1992; Baldwin & Clark, 2000) , which divides technologies into modules by standards: within modules, partial improvements and innovations are carried out around common standards; and between modules, an open architecture allows the system to work as a whole. Such a system, nevertheless, is constantly in the process of adaptation, revamping or even restructuring when colliding with other technological spaces. The competition over mobile communication standards is an excellent example (Fransman, 2001) .
The organizational space is centered on an organizational model, which evolves from organizational routines that are linked by interdependencies on a regional, national or even global basis. An organizational model usually defines the ways in which production should be organized and the division of labor between and within firms. In the IT industry, the change in the technological space appears as a shift in the organizational space, denoted as global production networks (Ernst and Kim, 2002) , or modular production system (Sturgeon, 2002) . This networked or modular model bears some similarity to the flexible specialization model (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sable and Zeitlin, 1985) in that they both recognize flexibility and specialization as fundamental alternatives to vertically integrated mass production. Before, vertically integrated corporations controlled all aspects of hardware and software production. Afterwards, instead of developing all components in-house, firms with fewer resources have been able to specialize in a specific component to reap economies of scale by serving the client base horizontally across the whole industry. However, there is a difference with respect to how flexibility and specialization are to be achieved. The networked/modular model is based on specialization of each horizontal segment or 'module' of the value chain where information regarding product and process specifications can be highly formalized. Segments or modules are then integrated through the speedy combination and recombination of inter-firm production networks on a global basis. It is the formalization of information and knowledge at the inter-firm link, and the globalization of value chain integration that gives this model its essential character: specialization, flexibility and economies of scale that accrue at the level of the industry that is, for most cases, territorially dispersed.
The third space, the territorial is formed around a regulation system, or an ensemble of regulation systems if extended to the global scale, and evolves from institutional norms, providing the embeddedness for economic actions. According to regulation theory, 'regulation' refers to a historically specific institutional regime for coordinating, stabilizing and reproducing socioeconomic relations, particularly the legal forms of monetary management, wage relation and competition (Boyer, 1990) . Economic geographers have extended this framework to include not only the legal infrastructure, but also a plethora of locally specific formal and informal institutions (Martin, 2000) . In this vein, the Taiwanese IT industry is an example of a Marshallian industrial district, 1 in which a spatial concentration of specialized small-and medium-sized firms is supported by a variety of regional institutions for promoting coordination, learning and innovation (Hsu, 2004; Wang, 2007) . However, accompanying the changes in the previous two spaces, there is also a restructuring in the territorial space, particularly on the territorial order or hierarchy, which shapes the relationship between the core and the peripheral regions. In the 1960s and 1970s, vertically integrated corporations in the US and Japan held most of the innovative and manufacturing capabilities within their home regions, and only transferred those which they considered to be low-end to Taiwan. This one-sided balance started to tip in the 1980s. On the one hand, vertically integrated corporations kept on shedding lower value-added segments in order to focus on core capabilities. On the other hand, latecomer firms in Taiwan continually absorbed these segments by accumulating innovation and management capabilities. Therefore, by the 1990s, the balance has been almost reversed. Except for some key segments, most segments and associated capabilities now reside in former peripheral regions.
When these three spaces are put together, it becomes clear that our meso-level context has provided a governance structure for coordinating evolutionary processes, not only in a single space, but also at the junctures of two or more spaces. Adapted from Herrigel's (1989) concept of industrial order, 2 Saxenian (1994) has proposed the notion of industrial system to grasp the context-specific, locally contingent nature of selfreinforcing economic development. As she argued (pp. 7-8):
The concept of an industrial system illuminates the historically evolved relationship between the internal organisation of firms and their connections to one another and to the social structure and institutions of their particular localities. It is helpful to think of a region's industrial system as having three dimensions: local institutions and culture, industrial structure, and corporate organization . . . Differing combinations of the three dimensions of an industrial system are possible, although they tend, in practice, to become mutually reinforcing components in coherent regional economies.
While the concept of industrial system was originally used to compare two high-tech clusters within the same country, we find it also useful as a conceptual framework applied in the context beyond the territorial space. One can make use of this conceptualization to trace the extension of a specific industrial system, for example, from a single territory to multiple territories by following the trails of coevolution between the territorial space and the other two spaces (Saxenian, 2006) . Such a system, however, has posed a great challenge on the governance given its intrinsic uncertainty and complexity. In the case of the Taiwanese IT industry, the governance agency derives from various sources. For some scholars, the most effective governance mechanism in the Taiwanese economy, or in the Chinese capitalist system, is social ties, ranging from strong ties such as kinship bonds to weak ties such as guanxi. They argue that these ties institutionalize trust, loyalty, reciprocity and reputation; they discourage opportunism and facilitate coordination and cooperation among small-and medium-sized enterprises (Hamilton, 1997; Chen, 1998) . For others, the 'visible hand' behind Taiwan's economic miracle is the developmental state. According to this view, state intervention, through a variety of industrial policies, not only stimulates the development of new industries, but also governs the rules that shape the market (Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990) . Analysts have recently focused on the technological characteristics of the IT industry to examine their implications on industrial organization. They argued that accelerated innovation and shortened product cycles have led to the modularization of production, which allows the speedy recombination of innovative components into rapidly changing end products. Within modular nodes, activities remain tightly integrated and based on tacit linkages, but between modular nodes, linkages could be achieved by the transfer of codified information to reduce transaction costs. Therefore, they see a revival of the market (Sturgeon, 2002; Langlois, 2003) , or the rise of e-Business measures (Chen, 2002; Macher et al., 2002) in governing economic transactions.
From a systemic view, all of these accounts offer only partial explanations. The governance of industrial organization should be seen as an evolutionary process in which a variety of mechanisms are at work over time (Lamoreaux et al., 2003) . To lay particular stress on one mechanism or a set of mechanisms at a given point of time runs the danger of losing track when others are dominant later on. For example, earlier works on Taiwanese economy tend to focus on the role of strong ties in organizing and coordinating production networks among kinship-based firms. But recent works have shifted to weak ties such as acquaintanceship and membership, which allow the generalized trust to be formed around professionalism, which permits quicker recombination of resources among nonkinship-based specialized producers (Hsu and Saxenian, 2000; Chen, 2003) . Figure 2 provides an analytical framework for the coordination of industrial system. As defined above, the industrial system comprises three spaces, each of which is organized around a set of rules, routines or norms, providing the platform for the coordination of collective actions therein. It is therefore that the junctures among these three constituent spaces become the locus of coordination in the industrial system, because they stand for coordinating challenges if frictions or inconsistencies emerge with regard to developmental trajectories, as well as coevolutionary opportunities if evolutionary processes along different trajectories are to be converging and mutually reinforcing. In other words, it is 'between', not 'within', that poses the challenges to systemic governance and opens up the opportunities for coevolution. However, the realization of these opportunities is never a self-actualizing process. It involves the coordination among a variety of coordination mechanisms, which, in turn, has to rely on the agency of actors to put coordination mechanisms into action. In Figure 2 , we use the Taiwanese IT industry to illustrate how the coordination becomes possible at the junctures of the industrial system. The imperative of coordination might start with an opportunity at any of the junctures, for example, a diversification opportunity at the juncture of the technological and the organizational spaces, or a relocation opportunity at the juncture of the organizational and the territorial spaces. The realization of this particular opportunity might call on a great number of stakeholders from 'between' as well as 'within'. To initiate the collaboration among these stakeholders and to direct their collective efforts, this imperative will be translated into an adaptation focus by a group of pioneers. The orchestration of collective efforts, according to North (1990) , is not implemented by actors individually, but mediated through various institutions, where actors could exercise their power to mobilize resources and put coordination mechanisms into use. As studies on the Taiwanese IT industry suggested (Castells and Hall, 1994; Kraemer et al., 1996; Hsu and Chiang, 2001; Mathews, 2002; Liu and Lee, 2005) , there are a variety of regionally as well as non-regionally based institutions supporting the coordination of the IT industry in Taiwan, including state agencies, foreign firms, local firms and global linkages. Each institution has its own coordination mechanisms and specific actors associated with it. For example, the state has nurtured technocrats who are capable of implementing industrial policies, while multinational corporations have trained cohorts of local managers to carry out foreign direct investment and outsourcing. Once a coalition is formed around an opportunity, then the stakeholders will be engaged in putting all relevant institutions and associated coordination mechanisms in line with the adaptation focus, and steer the system into a new coevolutionary path. Since the system must continually adapt to an environment that is evolving, different eras thus have different adaptation foci. It is therefore that, in the long run, the industrial system will develop two types of coordination agency: collaboration among a variety of actors to prevent the system from fragmentation; and the adaptability that enables the system to cope with uncertainty and change.
Research method
This article uses the case study to shed light on the coevolution emerging at the three junctures of the industrial system, as delineated in Section 2. The case study method provides a systematic way of looking at interdependent events, actors and mechanisms in their real-life contexts (Yin, 2003) . We chose the Taiwanese IT industry as our research target, and conducted three case studies to reflect its multi-faceted coevolutionary processes. The first case study explores the juncture between the territorial and the technological spaces, especially how Taiwan could build its technological capabilities nearly from scratch. Although this story has already been told several times, a reinterpretation is still necessary for a sharper understanding of collective actions and their evolutionary consequences. The second focuses on the juncture between the technological and the organizational spaces, especially how the Taiwanese IT industry could span its technologies from the personal computer (PC) to the handset sector. The third concerns the juncture between the organizational and the territorial spaces, especially how the Taiwanese IT industry could span territories, from Taiwan's TaipeiHsinchu region to China's Shanghai region.
The latter two studies are based on multiple data sources, which enabled us to obtain stronger substantiation of constructs by triangulating evidence from several sources. The first type of information was gathered from a systematic review of trade publications, industrial analyses and reports, business journals, company annual reports and publications. These data were used to provide background information and to sketch an overall picture of the phenomena analysed. The second type of information came from interviews. For the sectoral diversification, we interviewed senior managers from seven system firms that had taken the lead in moving from the PC to the handset sector, and key figures from regional institutions that supported diversification. If senior managers or key figures rejected interview requests, then we consulted industrial analysts and journalists to obtain insider information. For the spatial relocation, we carried out a set of interviews that targeted four types of institutions that were involved in the relocation process: lead firms that set out relocation, governmental agencies that hosted relocation firms, and research institutes and private agencies that supported relocation. We conducted 67 interviews over the summers of 2003, 2004 and 2006 (Appendix 1). All of the interviews were face-to-face and lasted 1-3 hours.
Promoting technological space: technological development in the Taiwanese IT industrial system
The formation of the Taiwanese IT industrial system dates to the 1970s when Taiwan started to build an indigenous supplier base for the IT industry. The state provided several 'big pushes' for the private sector to overcome the technological barriers that most latecomers faced. First, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), set up in 1973, started to fill the technological gaps by conducting government-funded R&D projects (Hsu and Chiang, 2001) . Secondly, the state established the Hsinchu Science Park to host start-ups with generous tax breaks and financial support, which has proven very successful in creating an innovative environment (Castells and Hall, 1994; Kraemer et al., 1996) . Thirdly, the state created several industrial consortia to promote technology learning and knowledge diffusion (Mathews, 2002) . The agency of these pushes came from a professionalized bureaucracy that had accumulated considerable capacity on policy planning, implementation and coordination since the postwar era. For example, K. T. Lee, the godfather of Taiwan's IT industry, had led key ministries and committees to make several critical decisions in promoting IT industry, including choosing IT as one of the national strategic industries, formulating policies to recruit overseas Taiwanese experts, and nurturing several semiconductor firms into national champions (Liu and Lee, 2005) .
At about the same time, foreign electronics multinational corporations (MNCs) such as RCA, Texas Instruments and Philips, also started to open branch plants in Taiwan in order to take advantage of cheap labor. They trained many local managers and engineers through technology transfer and on-the-job training, and some of them later spun off from these MNCs to start up their own. For example, several high-ranking executives in Compal, now the second largest laptop producer in Taiwan, came from the same branch of Texas Instruments. Promoted by state policies such as import controls and local content requirements, quite a few small-and medium-sized firms (SMEs) then grew around outsourcing networks of foreign MNCs, providing simple components such as tube transistors, integrated circuits and printed circuit boards. Therefore, by the late 1970s, a triangular collaboration emerged among technocrats, MNC managers and local entrepreneurs, through which local start-ups obtained policy support and technological inputs from the state, and gained direct and indirect technology transfer from foreign MNCs (Hobday, 1995; Amsden and Chu, 2003) .
This multilateral collaboration kept broadening and deepening in the 1980s. A new global linkage was formed between Taiwan and Silicon Valley in which the Taiwanese transnational technical community played a multiple coordinating role (Hsu and Saxenian, 2000; Saxenian and Hsu, 2001) . First, as the carrier of frontier technology and knowledge, this community transferred invaluable knowledge on global market and technology trends from Silicon Valley to Taiwan. Second, it provided entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that could function both in Silicon Valley and Taiwan. Third, leading figures in this community became consultants to Taiwan's government to assist in importing and building the institutions necessary for an innovative environment. With the help of the state and global linkages, specialized suppliers started burgeoning in increasingly fragmented niche markets. The industrial system also began to evolve around the business model of original equipment manufacture (OEM) (Hobday, 1995; Wu and Hsu, 2001 ). In this model, Taiwanese SMEs began to manufacture complete products according to the 'blueprints' provided by branded MNCs, and to cultivate managerial capabilities by organizing their own production networks or supply chains. As a consequence, foreign MNCs in Taiwan were gradually relegated to stand-alone international procurement offices with the focus on outsourcing. The coordination of local production networks thus increasingly devolved to Taiwanese firms specializing in system integration, such as Acer and Mitac.
The 1990s witnessed a further devolution of branded MNCs in production, and an accompanying expansion of Taiwan-based production networks. The industrial system began to upgrade toward the original design manufacture (ODM) model (Hobday, 1995) . Under this new arrangement, Taiwanese firms began to take over some or all design-related activities, and by so doing, they were able to expand their capabilities into product design, component design and sometimes even product development, all of which had formerly been core capabilities of branded MNCs. During this period, some Taiwanese firms became lead firms in coordinating local production networks and grew as MNCs in managing production at both the local and global level (Chen and Liu, 2000; Ernst, 2000) . A change also occurred in the multilateral collaboration among regional institutions. More coordination took place in the interactions between lead firms and their suppliers, and local managerial community emerged as the primary coordinator in leveraging resources within the industrial system. At the same time, the state retreated to a supporter in providing collective goods such as R&D subsidies, financial supports and infrastructure improvement. Global linkages also played a secondary role in transferring technology, skill and expertise.
This review has shown that in the beginning, the state pulled together all efforts to build an indigenous supplier base. When the window of opportunity opened during industrial decentralization in the 1980s, the linkage with Silicon Valley became critical in channeling opportunities into Taiwan and in releasing Taiwan's potential in innovation and entrepreneurship. As the scale and scope of outsourcing increased in the 1990s, local firms took the lead in industrial upgrading and growth. This brief historical account has shown collaborative adaptation to be the outcome of an interactive process among a variety of institutions and associated groups of actors. This allows the system to adapt to a rapidly changing environment and to transform gradually from a low-cost supplier base to a global center in the IT industry.
Re-configuring organizational space: sectoral diversification and collaborative learning
The evolution so far is still confined to a single industrial sector, which makes the coordination largely a sectoral issue. Yet the technological change since the 1990s, particularly convergence, has relentlessly redrawn industrial boundaries among three formerly separate sectors: computer, communications and consumer electronics (Steinbock, 2003) . In the past, the evolution of technologies and products in these three sectors was largely an intra-sectoral affair; the computer has evolved from mainframes, minicomputers to personal computers; communications has developed from pre-cellular, first, to second generation; consumer electronics has advanced toward minimalization, personalization and digitalization. Now with the advent of the Internet and mobile telephony, all these three sectors have converged into the handset, whether the personal data assistant, the smart phone or the multimedia player.
To grasp this opportunity, and to turn it to its own advantage, Taiwan's IT industry has carried out large-scale sectoral diversification through collaborative learning in product development, component development and supply chain recombination. Product development, or system integration at the product level, is one of the most frequently cited competitive advantages of Taiwan's IT industry (Amsden and Chu, 2003) . By rapid bundling, unbundling and re-bundling of various product features, Taiwanese system firms are capable of developing a new product every few months to satisfy constantly changing niche markets. Yet switching from the personal computer (PC) to the handset has gone beyond the capabilities of system firms, thus calling for collaborative learning of the industrial system as a whole. In such a system-level collaborative learning, system firms are often pioneers in taking initiatives. Ben Q, the first PC firm that pioneered the diversification, began with recruiting Taiwanese overseas experts from Silicon Valley and San Diego where leading US communications firms are located. Because there were initially no communications engineers in Taiwan's local labor market, it took the lead in sending engineers for training in Europe and the US, or by inviting foreign experts to Taiwan to offer training courses. The other two pioneers, Lite-on and DBTel, also built their manpower through head hunting and on-the-job training. The role of these pioneers in talent training was so important that a top manager in DBTel claims, 'To some degree, we were just like doing what ITRI did before: to nurture talents, and to disperse them in the industry, you know, the cradle of talents. Now almost every handset firm has our engineers.' (Interview, D-F2-1)
The state came onto the scene when there was a strong need for policy support in the industry. Premier Zhan Lian called on overseas specialists to set up a special committee, which was led by C. Y. Lee, a well-known wireless specialist in Silicon Valley. This committee suggested that the state take two initiatives to promote the development of communications technologies. First, it launched the 'Telecommunications National Technology Development Program', setting aside 15-17 million dollars annually for R&D projects on wireless communications since the late 1990s. Second, it formed several collaboration forums, including the 3G Club, and the Wireless Communication Strategy Alliances to unite stakeholders from industry, academia and research. The rationale for these initiatives was to create an interactive platform for these stakeholders to discuss how to mobilize resources and capabilities for the development of wireless communications (Interview, D-G2-6).
With this assistance from the state, Taiwanese system firms managed to catch up within only a few years. According to the general manager of a system firm who led a R&D team to develop the handset:
In the beginning, radio frequency tuning seemed to be most critical but few experts could be found outside the military, so we resorted to cooperate with hobbyists on the one hand, and to push the government to import experts on the other. So you can find quite a few Russian engineers in ITRI at that time. Later, the focus turned to be software. Everyone started to buy software, modify software, and even write software by its own. After that, it became verification because all handsets have to be verified before being approved in many different cellular networks in many different countries. We then again sent our engineer teams to everywhere on the one hand, and pushed the government to import verification firms on the other. Now, it comes the mechanical, which includes almost everything, from material, texture, touch, to industrial design. It is back to our core capabilities eventually. Anyway, after passing the whole process, we all have learnt what we should learn. (Interview, The national and transnational technical communities have also promoted collaborative learning. Local research institutes have long acted as sources of technologies and talent for the industry (Hsu and Chiang, 2001 ). Three of them were involved in the 'Telecommunications National Technology Development Program'. Two sub-institutes under the umbrella of ITRI-the Electric Research and Services Organization (ERSO) and the Computer and the Communication Research Laboratory (CCL)-were responsible for hardware and software-oriented projects, respectively. The ChungShan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), is the talent tank for the military and was the only talent pool of communications in Taiwan, was asked to establish an industrial park to transfer related technologies to private firms. When serious shortages were discovered in certain fields, the transnational technical community answered the call. For example, Greg Lan, a specialist for RCA and Hughes for fifteen years, had returned from the US to found a design firm for radio frequency integrated circuit (RF IC) in Taiwan. This firm helped to fill Taiwan's vacuum in this area from design, process development, testing to packaging.
The most significant contribution of these technical communities is brain circulation, that is, the diffusion of technology and knowledge through the circulation of talents. By tapping the sources of technologies and talents residing in these communities, lead firms in Taiwan's IT industry started to crowd into the handset sector. Compal, the secondlargest laptop producer, merged with a handset firm that was run by diaspora engineers from BenQ. Quanta, the largest laptop producer, recruited the then director of ERSO to establish a handset research team. Asustek, the largest motherboard producer, recruited a whole research team from CSIST. The most aggressive case came from Honhai. It first poached about one hundred handset engineers from DBTel and Quanta by offering high pay and stock option. It then recruited two top managers from leading global communications firms and a top expert from the military. These endeavors have accelerated the speed of technology learning and diffusion. In the words of a senior industrial analyst: 'Thanks to brain circulation, the expertise that foreign firms had accumulated for decades was soon diffused among Taiwanese firms in just few years.' (Interview, Component development is another aspect of product development. As functions are added, the number of components used in a handset sometimes exceeded three hundred. Yet unlike PC components that have standardized specifications, handset components usually have to customize according to different size, shape, material and functional requirements. Therefore the diversification from the PC to the handset also involves collaborative learning among a large number of producers specialized in a wide array of components. For components that are common to the PC and the handset, diversification often means downsizing to fit smaller handsets. For example, by raising density and adding more layers into their products, Taiwan's printed circuit board producers have succeeded in meeting size and performance requirements of the handset and grabbed 40% of global market share in (YCPS, 2003 . For components that are specific to the handset, however, diversification has had to rely on collaboration among the state, component firms and system firms.
A bureaucrat from the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) compares this process to filling 'missing links' between PC and handset supply chains:
from the systemic point of view, we would see what components we don't have and then support start-ups producing such components through grants, subsidies and other policy tools. But sometimes system firms are still unwilling to use these immature components, then we have to persuade, again, through some policy tools. We all know it is worthwhile because using local components would not only save cost substantially, but also shorten delivery time, say, from weeks to days. (Interview, As soon as Taiwanese producers had diversified their capabilities from the PC to the handset, the focus of collaborative learning shifted to supply chain recombination. The speedy reshuffle and recombination of specialized producers within the industrial system allows Taiwanese system firms to add or upgrade product features quickly and flexibly, from color screen, chord ring, tri-band, phone camera, blue tooth to other emerging cutting-edge features. Three mechanisms are facilitating such a recombination. The first is collaborative management on the supply chain between system firms and component firms. The Taiwanese IT industry has built an efficient interface for supply chain management to bring together global buyers, local system firms and local component firms based on international standard organization standards, enterprise resource planning, electronic data interchange and other benchmark measures. Many system firms have taken advantage of this interface to extend their supply chains from the PC to the handset. This could not only orchestrate the processes from design, procurement, pilot run to mass production, but also ensure the quality and sources of all components involved in these processes.
The second is cross-investment from system firms to component firms, and vice versa. Through cross-investment, both system firms and component firms could develop symbiotic relationships while maintaining their respective autonomy. Honhai, for example, has built an intensive investment and cross-investment network covering more than two hundred firms in the PC and the handset (CCIS, 2004) , which allows it to deploy supply chains quickly and to take advantage of every possible opportunity emerging from new market demands.
The third is collaborative coordination through peer groups, the real 'coordinators' of supply chain recombination. Three types of peer groups become critical in constructing supply chain at the regional and global levels: international procurement officers from global lead firms, top managers from local system firms, and local component firms. In global supply chain coordination, procurement officers choose the finished products and decide how much quantity to be outsourced to Taiwan, the top managers integrate the supply chain vertically, and the local component firms are horizontally inserted into segments of the supply chain. The coordination, however, is an interactive rather than a one-way process. According to a general manager of a system firm:
We all know each other quite well. Many of them came from HP, Dell, with whom we have worked for quite a long time before. Many of the heads in Taiwanese firms were also transferred from the PC. Before, only those who cannot do well in the PC jumped into the handset. Now almost all major players have joined the competition. There is no key component we cannot do now, from the most qualitative to the most quantitative. So everyone now is thinking how to replicate the supply chain game from the PC to the handset. I think it is just a matter of time. (Interview, D-F3-1) Through collaborative learning among major players within the industrial system, Taiwanese IT industry has built up capabilities around handset production within only a few years. Taiwan did not begin manufacturing handsets until the late 1990s, but by the early 2000s, Taiwan's system firms were among top ODM producers, and had become a presence among branded producers in the global handset industry. The achievements of Taiwanese component firms are no less impressive. They have dominated the markets for a large and growing range of handset components, from outer parts such as keypads, cases and phone cameras, peripherals such as chargers and SIM cards, to inner parts such as printed circuit boards.
6. Re-shaping territorial space: cross-border relocation and institutional building Adaptation across the national border posed an even greater challenge to decentralized coordination. In the late 1990s, the business model of Taiwanese industrial organizations changed. In order to comply with increasingly stringent requirements from branded MNCs, 3 leading Taiwanese firms developed a new model of global logistics (Chen and Liu, 2000) . The locus of this model is the shipment hub, which collects major components, assembles them into semi-final products (or bare-bones), and ships them to inventory centers in major markets around the world. As China emerges as the low-cost site for production as well as logistics operations, the hub has been gradually moved from Taiwan to China. Accompanying this move, specialized suppliers have followed their lead firms to cluster nearby. By 2002, a large share of desktop and laptop production, along with many components, had been relocated from Taiwan to China (Table 1 ).
The relocation of the shipment hub and associated supply chains involved the transplantation of the whole industrial system across the border. In the early 1990s, a structural coupling appeared among Chinese local states in the Shanghai region and Taiwanese investors in the IT industry. On the one hand, China's central government began to change the focus of its economic reform from the Guangzhou region to the Shanghai region, and initiated a series of projects to develop Shanghai as the new economic center of China (She et al., 1997) , triggering a competition over inward investment among local states in the Shanghai region. On the other hand, Taiwanese IT firms began to look for appropriate habitats for transplantation, and turned their attention from the already congested Shenzhen to the newly emerging Shanghai. By the mid 1990s, the share of Taiwanese FDI in the Shanghai region started to surpass that in the Shenzhen region, and by 2000, the Shanghai region alone had taken more than half of Taiwanese FDI in China (MOEAIC, 2005) .
However, instead of choosing the center of region-Shanghai itself-Taiwanese investors preferred adjacent smaller cities. There were three reasons for this. First, production cost was still their primary concern. Compared to Shanghai, which was notorious for its high rents and limited supply of land, small cities were able to offer cheaper and more abundant land. Second, small cities were more willing to meet the demands of foreign investors. Third, transplantation required a great deal of administrative support from the local governments. Small cities were also able to provide more room for negotiation and collaboration vis-a`-vis larger or higher level cities. As a result, the Suzhou municipality (Suzhou City plus several satellite cities, including Kunshan and Wujiang) stands out as the new habitat of Taiwanese IT industry. In 2001, Taiwanese investments constituted 80%, 53% and 95% of all FDI in the cities of Kunshan, Suzhou and Wujiang, respectively.
The key of transplantation lay in institution building: the reconstruction of supportive institutions for decentralized coordination in situ of the host region. Two groups of actors became critical in the process of institutional building. One group consisted of local cadres from Chinese local states, who filled the institutional gaps caused by economic transition, and in bringing new institutions to locales. The other was the Taiwanese cross-border managerial community, who worked on both sides of the Straits to mobilize resources and capabilities, and to import institutions from Taiwan to China. Institution building, however, was a mutual process, in which both parties collaborated. The focus of the first stage was to reconfigure local states' resources toward attracting inward investment. The Suzhou area was renowned for its rural industrialization, based on town and village enterprises (TVEs), in which local governments served as business corporations (Walder, 1995) . To compete for inward investment, it was thus imperative to transform local governments from entrepreneurs to service providers. In Kunshan, Li-gan Wu was the first Taiwanese investor, to lead the local state's transformation, changing the type of foreign-invested enterprise from an 'equity joint venture' to a 'wholly foreign-owned enterprise', 4 tailoring government services to the needs of foreign investors, and building infrastructure for export-processing activities. These efforts earned him the title of the foreign major of Kunshan (Yang, 1995, Chapter 3) . In Suzhou, a collaboration process linked the local authority with the first Taiwanese firm (BenQ) that relocated to Suzhou since both started from scratch and even shared a building for the first few years. They worked closely in planning and constructing the industrial park, and setting up the regulations and codes. This interactive process, according to a top manager in BenQ, 'is more like regeneration than transplantation, because we have to regenerate from here [Suzhou] again'. (Interview, In the second stage, the emphasis shifted to the rebuilding of the supply chain. To facilitate this process, local states adopted the 'anchor tenant' strategy. An anchor tenant was a lead firm that could rally its followers and publicize a locale. First, the local state would provide the anchor with preferential treatments in terms of land prices, tax exemptions, infrastructure support, and administrative services. Second, after having attracted an anchor tenant, the local state then targeted its downstream and upstream firms along its supply chain to persuade them to follow suit. In the words of a Chinese journalist who covered the emergence of the Taiwanese cluster in Suzhou: 'it took advantage of the chain-like characteristic of Taiwanese cluster, to pull out a whole chain with only one stroke' (Interview, R-P8-1). Yet this strategy also required close collaboration with anchors. For example, to persuade its suppliers to relocate to Suzhou, BenQ arranged three site tours for three groups of suppliers, including some that had followed BenQ to Malaysia, some that BenQ had nurtured in Malaysia, and some that had already settled in the Guangzhou region. After visiting the site and building consensus with BenQ, fourteen out of thirty suppliers agreed to relocate. However, by the early 2000s, almost all of the lead firms in Taiwan's IT industry had opened manufacturing facilities in the Suzhou area (TRI, 2002a, b, c) .
The most sophisticated task came in the third stage. A cross-border transfer of institutions occurred through what some scholar called 'transborder governance' between Taiwanese investors and Chinese local cadres (Po and Pun, 2004) . In order to meet the stringent requirements of global logistics, leading Taiwanese investors started to lobby for the institutions that they desperately needed. They either became consultants to local states to cultivate cadres, or became a pressure group through Taiwanese investors' associations to persuade local states to import those institutions.
In return, local cadres began digesting, absorbing and duplicating the Taiwan experience, while also learning about and importing institutions from Taiwan. For example, through the mediation of Taiwanese investors, Kunshan's political leaders visited Taiwan's export processing zones (EPZs) and the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park, to gain experience from Taiwan officials. They also invited retired officials to transfer their experiences from Taiwan to Kunshan. These intensive crossborder interactions have led to the establishment of the first EPZ in China and to many other institutional innovations such as e-governance and e-commerce.
Through the efforts of Taiwanese investors and Chinese local cadres, a new industrial system was rebuilt in the Suzhou area. By 2003, all major Taiwanese laptop producers and their suppliers had settled there. Other segments in the IT industry also gained a foothold in the Suzhou area, including printed circuit boards, monitors, scanners and motherboards. As a consequence, Suzhou's share in laptop production has jumped from nearly zero to more than 50% within only two years (MIC, 2005) .
Concluding remarks
In this article we have proposed a meso-level conceptual framework for unpacking the black box of coevolution in a regional economy, which takes both territorial and nonterritorial contexts into account, to link microevents and occurrences on the one hand, and to their coevolutionary outcomes on the other. We have argued that coevolution depends upon the reinforcement and amplification of agglomerations and externalities at the junctures of three spaces: the technological, the organizational and the territorial. Furthermore, these spaces are both the results of the evolution of rules, routines and institutions at the micro-level and the platforms shaping coevolutionary trajectories at the macro-level. We have empirically used the Taiwanese IT industry to illustrate how our framework might be mobilized for territorial-technological upgrading, sectoral diversification and spatial relocation that happened at the junctures of the territorial and technological, the technological and the organizational, and the organizational and the territorial, respectively.
Taiwan's case clearly shows that coevolution is not a self-actualizing process, but one that is derived from collaborative adaptation among numerous interconnected and interdependent firms, which is orchestrated by a multiplicity of coordination mechanisms supported by a variety of embedded institutions. It is usually the changes in global industrial environments that open the window of opportunities for coevolution in the industrial system, for example, to enter a new industry, diversify into a new sector, or relocate to a new region. However, to grasp these opportunities, and to transform them in favor of the industrial system itself, it is still the adaptability that tells the story. This adaptability comes from the coordination agency that evolves among the state (in Taiwan as well as in China), local firms, foreign firms and global linkages, which enable the decentralized industrial system to function like an integrated organization. The coordination, however, is more egalitarian than hierarchical, which works largely on the basis of negotiation, consensus building and collaboration among coordinators. When opportunities emerge, the coordination agency soon develops the new adaptation focus to direct all collaborative efforts toward the realization of these opportunities. Therefore, although small firms are ill-equipped to compete in an industry like IT, that requires a broad range of capabilities, through collaborative adaptation that pulls together capabilities from numerous specialized participants, the system can still broaden and deepen its capability pool over time.
Taiwan's case also suggests that globalization of industrial organization may be more variable and contingent than current imagination and understanding, because it happens not only on multiple scales, but also in multiple arenas. Studies of global commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994, 1996) or global production networks (Borrus et al., 2000; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Yusuf et al., 2004) tended to focus on the organizational space, and assumed a hierarchical governance structure dominated by either commodity-chain drivers or network flagships. In this structure, drivers or flagships occupy the highest hierarchical layer to command participants at lower layers from all over the world through the control over critical assets such as de facto standards, intellectual property rights, brand names and marketing channels. The hierarchy divides higher from lower tiers. On the one hand, although high tiers continually shed capabilities, they still maintain their dominance by continuing the control over critical assets. On the other hand, although there is an upgrading path providing for lower tiers, this path has a glass ceiling because the power asymmetry works to the disadvantage of lower tiers in the head-on competition with higher tiers. However, the focus on the organizational space often overlooks the transformative effects or processes from other spaces. It could be argued that the chain or the network does not organize production from the global to the local, but co-existent industrial systems constantly shape and reshape the outlook of the chain or the network from the local to the global. If this is the case, then social struggles among these systems, not those among drivers or flagships will decide the developmental trajectories of globalization.
What policy lessons or implications for regional development might be drawn from our analysis? Three are particularly noteworthy here, although they deserve further research. First, policymakers need considerable stocks of knowledge not only about the territorial space, but also about the technological and the organizational spaces, most of which may reside outside their territory. It is now the new collective wisdom, both in economic geography and business management, that globalization has brought out a new world of localized specialization in which regional development is driven by increasing return processes that are based on knowledge and innovation. It is therefore regional policies upon which we should focus on the availability of increasing returns derived from territorial agglomerations, as well as technological and organizational externalities. Secondly, the formulation of regional policies needs to extend beyond the scope of specific territory to incorporate a reflexive understanding of multiple institutional configurations in which all relevant policymakers are situated. This will call for collaboration among former rivals. While some of these collaborations will pull against local endeavors, an appreciation of regional interdependencies is a crucial first step in harnessing extra-local connections. Thirdly, the changing boundary of the industrial system implies a need to balance the openness and enclosure of the industrial system. Taiwan has demonstrated the importance of the openness to the continuous upgrading and growth of the industrial system. It could be argued that this openness to global linkages is what keeps the Taiwanese industrial system adaptable to external changes and capable of tapping into external resources. This is especially important in a contemporary era of globalization, where intense global competition constantly calls for flexible and efficient recombination of capabilities and resources at both the local and global levels. However, the industrial system as a social system must have a distinctive identity that is constantly reproduced from elements that had previously been filtered from an overly complex environment, which Luhmann (1995) called 'autopoiesis'. The system is therefore autopoietically closed in the ways which it uses and relies on resources from its environment.
A key question for further research, then, is how we can identify the mechanisms of autopoiesis by which the industrial system determines whether it is open or closed to its environment. Many unresolved issues are associated with the industrial system. We do not know much about the dynamics of industrial system. What are the relationships and interactions among its three constituent spaces? Are multiple interactions and multiple sources of selection shaping the evolution of each space or the coevolution between two or more spaces? Furthermore, what is the limitation of an industrial system as it keeps extending its domain by grasping opportunities from coevolution, for example, sectoral diversification or spatial relocation? To what extent will the opportunities and possibilities emerged from coevolution be exhausted? 
